

The "Implied Author".
Explication and Use of a Controversial Concept*

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Our paper focuses on the concept, coined by Wayne C. Booth, of the "implied author", which became one of the most successful, though from the outset most controversial, notions in twentieth-century literary studies. The impetus for our discussion of the "implied author" comes not only from the ambiguity of the concept itself, but also from the dissatisfaction of critics with it and the various proposals for jettisoning or replacing it.

Since it seems to us that proposals for abandoning or replacing the concept of the "implied author" can scarcely be successful if they ignore the relevant context of problems, we shall begin by briefly reconstructing the intellectual framework within which the concept was first shaped and defined. The second part of our paper looks at the response of literary critics to the concept, using selected examples of its academic reception. A classification of the reception types provides an indication of the purposes served by a concept such as the "implied author" and the contexts in which it is needed. Finally, we set out proposals for replacing the concept in two of these contexts – "description" and "interpretation".

1.

In his discussion of Gérard Genette's *Narrative Discourse*¹, Wayne C. Booth uses the example of Proust to distinguish between two different 'program languages',² or, as he puts it, "two kinds of rhetorical drive":

[...] the effort at a descriptive poetics, calling to our attention everything one can find in Proust's work, whether Proust can in any sense be said to have intended it; and the effort to do a normative rhetoric, finding and evaluating everything in Proust's work that *works*.³

Booth has never made a secret of his support for a normative rhetoric. The further significance of the above distinction between "descriptive poetics" and "normative poetics", which he sometimes contrasts as "sciences of fiction" and "rhetorics of fiction"⁴, may possibly be clarified by the following historical sketch, locating Booth's work and theoretical position in the context of the neo-Aristotelian Chicago School of literary critics.⁵

In the mid-1930s, citing Aristotle's *Poetics* and other Aristotelian writings, the Chicago Critics called for a fundamental reorientation of literary studies. Following the path outlined in Ronald S. Crane's programmatic essay "History Versus Criticism in the Study of Literature"⁶, they urged their colleagues to abandon historical and biographical approaches and the study of taste, and to focus instead on the literary work of art as a rhetorically structured whole. This was a shift of perspective on approximately the same lines as that called for by the New Critics. Apart from certain assumptions about the structured nature of the literary work, the distinctive feature of the Chicago critics vis-à-vis the latter school was their rhetorical orientation, with its insistence on viewing the literary text as a form of communication between writer and reader. However, the first generation of Chicago critics concentrated on the text itself, paying scant attention to the author and reader or to the concepts of intention and effect.⁷

This changed radically with the second generation of Chicago critics, whose internationally best-known representative was and is Wayne C. Booth. Booth, who grew up in a Mormon community in Utah and briefly served as a missionary⁸, began his academic career as a loyal follower of the Chicago School⁹; however, as he emphasized once more in 1995, his academic work, too, always had a basic ethical orientation:

My most overt missionary work, from the time when I was literally a missionary for the Mormon church on, has largely been centered, [...] on how persons, characters, and selves, real or literary, are made and improved or debased by rhetoric. In the hierarchy of goods served or harmed by rhetoric, the quality of rhetors and their hearers has indeed been my center.¹⁰

Historians of literary studies agree that Booth's seminal work, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, is characterized by this same ethical impulse, to which he also remained faithful later.¹¹ However, controversy still surrounds the question whether this book exploded the program of the neo-Aristotelian Chicago

School¹² or merely expanded it to the point inherent in its original conception – Booth himself is of the latter opinion.¹³ In the context of New Criticism, fenced about with prohibitions and hardened dogmas, the prospects for an ethically oriented¹⁴ rhetorical analysis of literary character, plot and narrative strategy were extremely poor. In 1968, Booth wrote:

A generation had come to accept without thinking that a true 'poem' (including fiction) should not mean but be. With the author ruled out under the 'intentional fallacy' and the audience ruled out under the 'affective fallacy', with the world of ideas and beliefs ruled out under the 'didactic heresy' and with narrative interest ruled out under the 'heresy of plot' some doctrines of autonomy had become so desiccated that only verbal and symbolic interrelationships remained.¹⁵

From everything we know, it would appear that, at the time of conceiving *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, Booth was convinced, on the one hand, of the "intentional fallacy"¹⁶ – a dogma still in wide circulation today, despite the fundamental criticisms to which it has been subjected¹⁷ – but on the other hand clung to the idea that literary works constituted intentionally structured normative worlds which were accessible to ethical criticism. The concept of the "implied author" seems to have played a key part in reconciling these two ideas. The concept enabled Booth to carry on believing that he could interpret and criticize the normative worlds of literary works without stepping beyond the limits of the text and falling victim to a "fallacy". Thus the "implied author" was a compromise solution, allowing Booth to maintain his ethical viewpoint, but at the expense of theoretical clarity. The concept was unclear from the outset, since it embraced both descriptive and interpretative aspects for the purpose of defining the normative orientation of texts: plot, character and narrative structures were described, but their specifically "intended" nature was determined with the help of interpretations. Although Booth always represented these interpretations as the results of "intrinsic" textual observations, they made so much use of external material that he soon acquired the reputation of a covert or even overt intentionalist.¹⁸ In the afterword to the second edition, Booth himself admitted that he had only stated his position in *The Rhetoric of Fiction* implicitly, which had led to misunderstandings¹⁹; however, he has never published a comprehensively revised version of the book²⁰.

2.

After this outline of the context of problems in which the idea of the "implied author" emerged, we shall now look at the subsequent reception of the concept by literary critics. Obviously, our approach has to be selective, focusing on the major contributions to the discussion on the concept, since it would be impossible to consider the entire range of responses.²¹ Nor do we propose to trace the history of the debate on the "implied author"; instead, we have tried to classify the types of response systematically.²² Analyzing the main documents in the reception of the concept, we find that much of the discussion takes place in two contexts of problems – in connection with description, on the one hand, and with interpretation, on the other.

Within the context of interpretation, two sub-classes have to be distinguished. The first of these is mainly concerned with the problems of interpreting literary texts: Booth's concept is not discussed as a category of narrative theory, but in terms of its uses in connection with a theory of interpretation. The contributions of this type generally characterize and criticize the notion of the "implied author" against the background of the authors' own convictions and assumptions about the theory of interpretation, describing the concept as theoretically problematic and/or empirically flawed; more sophisticated reconstructions of the concept are seldom encountered.²³

By far the largest number of reception documents is found in the second sub-class of this type of reception. Here, too, Booth's concept is discussed in the context of the problems of interpretation; however, the aim is not to evaluate it from a theoretical point of view, but to assess its concrete function in the practice of interpretation, for which it is assumed in principle to be suited. The members of this class place different demands on the description which is to precede the interpretation of the text, but they agree that the concept of the implied author offers an ideal way of bringing description and interpretation together. Modifications of the concept are often suggested which generally boil down to two suggestions for a future, more precise use: on the one hand, the implied author of a text is to be understood as the nexus of values and norms in the textual world²⁴; on the other, the concept is taken to denote the strategy underlying the selection and ordering of the elements of narrative texts.²⁵

Placing the emphasis on these aspects of the "implied author", the concept is defended against a number of uses suggested by Booth's term, which is generally seen as ill-chosen.²⁶ Thus, the implied author is expressly defined as a semantic quantity, a concept constructed by the reader on the basis of textual features²⁷; it is characterized as "voiceless and silent"²⁸ and therefore fundamentally distinct from the fictional narrator or speaker. The attempt to define the concept often ends with Booth's own suggestion that it would be preferable to speak of an "inferred" rather than an "implied" author.²⁹

The third type of reception criticizes the "implied author" in the context of a descriptive narratology. Whereas, in the type of reception discussed above, the significance of the concept for a theory of narrative or interpretation generally remains unclear³⁰, the explication of the concept found in the third type leads to the formulation of a fundamental difference between Booth's idea and the concepts of narratology. The exponents of this reception type argue that, whereas narrative theory provides a set of instruments for describing texts³¹, the "implied author" is only relevant for the purpose of interpretation; the phenomena subsumed under this concept – i.e., broadly speaking, the normative order of the fictional world of a narrative text – can only be derived from a description of the text and only in connection with an interpretation of it.³² According to this view, while the description of a text is a basic requirement for interpreting it, interpretation does not necessarily follow from description. The "implied author" is not criticized per se; the point is rather that narratology, as a genre-specific descriptive language, has no place for a concept seen as encompassing the "'norms' of the text"³³ or even "the totality of meaning that can be inferred from a text".³⁴ This is the line taken by Genette: "[N]arratology has no need to go beyond the narrative situation, and the two agents 'implied author' and 'implied reader' are clearly situated in that beyond"³⁵. Although the advocates of a descriptive narratology do not wish to dispense with the notion of the "implied author", they suggest giving it a name that accords more closely with its theoretical status³⁶; Mieke Bal, for example, suggests quite simply that it would be better "to speak of the interpretation, or the overall meaning of the text"³⁷.

Our brief examination of the reception of Booth's "implied author" has shown that the concept is discussed in connection with two main sets of problems: those of description and those of interpretation. We have characterized these contexts of problems according to the authors' own descriptions of their ideas and aims; the theories and methodologies used within the individual reception documents have been left out of account.

In most of the reception documents, the concept of the "implied author" is used for purposes of interpretation, although the interpretive passages are often preceded by extensive narratological descriptions. In a minority of the documents, the concept is discussed only in the context of a descriptive narratology which remains uninterested in the concept and cannot find a use for it.

Our concluding proposal for a way of using the concept refers to its use in the above-mentioned contexts of problems relating to description and interpretation. Of course, simply taking these contexts as they stand, without further examination, is itself problematic, given the lack of a serious ongoing discussion on the definition of "interpretation" and "description", let alone a consensus as to their meaning.³⁸ The basing of our own proposal on these contexts of problems is only possible because the previous commentators who have talked about the "implied author" all appear to have definite, if unclearly stated, ideas about what they want to achieve in using the term.

The proposal itself can be stated very briefly. For the context of description, the concept of the "implied author" clearly has to be abandoned, since there is no place for it – as we have seen – in a descriptive narratology.

For the context of interpretation, the use of the concept poses greater problems, for the following reasons. All the commentators in this group seek to use the concept of the "implied author" for interpretive purposes; however, many of them also supplement their interpretation with detailed narratological descriptions, and not only fail to indicate the transition from description to interpretation; but also apparently remain unaware of the theoretical status of their work, combining descriptive and interpretive statements. To us, it seems that the popularity of the "implied author" in the practice of literary interpretation stems in large measure from the fact that it offers an excellent means of blurring the dividing line between description and interpretation, so that the latter

appears to follow seamlessly from the former – with no need for interpreters to select a particular conception of meaning and state the reasons for their choice. Those who employ the concept in this way will be unwilling to accept a proposal which would oblige them to acknowledge that their own interpretive practice is flawed.

However, for the context of interpretation, we would like to make two modest proposals. One way of remedying the deficiencies outlined above would consist in simply replacing the "implied author" by the "author". This would limit the user to an intentionalist conception of meaning, but not to a particular interpretive methodology, or to a specific type of documentary evidence or set of aesthetic assumptions.³⁹ If the latter aspects of the theory of interpretation were specified more exactly, it would be possible also to consider some of the further intuitions associated with the concept of the "implied author" – for example, by stressing the methodological requirement that preference be given to "intrinsic" versus "extrinsic" textual evidence for the purpose of interpretation. Objections to replacing the concept of the "implied author" by that of the "author" are to be expected from those who uphold the idea of the "intentional fallacy". However, these objections would have to be articulated at the higher level of sophistication seen in recent work on the subject, and it is likely that the theoretical problems of an intentionalist conception of meaning are no more serious, at least, than those posed by the theoretically and methodologically careless use of the concept of the "implied author".

Finally, those users of the concept of the "implied author" who nevertheless wish to cling to a non-intentionalist conception of meaning should be required to examine or at least indicate the consequences of this choice for their conception of meaning and interpretation. Here, it would be advisable, as a first step, to adopt a different term, involving less risk of confusion with an intentionalist conception of meaning. Secondly, the users of the concept should give at least a broad indication of what such a conception of meaning – relabelled as "textual intention" or "narrative strategy" to avoid misunderstandings – might look like. For example, they would have to specify the "lexicon" to be used in determining the meaning of the elements of a text, and to state the assumptions governing the transition from the description of those elements to the determining of the textual intention. To critics of concepts such as "textual intention", this would also demonstrate how a non-intentionalist

conception of meaning can limit interpretive ascriptions of meaning, both in general⁴⁰ and in relation to intentionalist conceptions of interpretation⁴¹.

Neither of the two proposals for replacing Booth's concept preserves its original meaning. However, in view of the concept's genesis and previous use, as reconstructed above, we feel there would be little point in trying to find a replacement which conserves its full range of meaning; instead, with a concept such as the "implied author", it is clearly preferable to explicate and clarify the main aspects and underlying intentions of the idea and its various uses. The first proposal therefore focuses on the intentionalist content of the "implied author" and aims to ground it in an appropriate conception of meaning and a conception of interpretation specifically tailored to the latter; such an approach would probably correspond most closely to Booth's own uses and subsequent explanations of the concept. The second proposal emphasizes the non-intentionalist aspects of the "implied author"; but necessitates a whole series of supplementary conceptual explanations.

* Shortened English version of Tom Kindt, Hans-Harald Müller: Der "implizite Autor". Zur Explikation und Verwendung eines umstrittenen Begriffs. In: Fotis Jannidis, Gerhard Lauer, Matias Martinez, Simone Winko (ed.): Rückkehr des Autors. Zur Erneuerung eines umstrittenen Begriffs. Tübingen: Niemeyer 1999, pp. 273-87.

¹ See Gérard Genette: *Narrative Discourse. An Essay in Method*. New York: Cornell University Press 1980.

² See Lutz Danneberg: *Zwischen Innovation und Tradition: Begriffsbildung und Begriffsentwicklung als Explikation*. In: Christian Wagenknecht (ed.): *Zur Terminologie der Literaturwissenschaft. Akten des IX. Germanistischen Symposions der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft Würzburg 1986*. Stuttgart: Metzler 1988, pp. 50-68, especially pp. 61-2.

³ Wayne Booth: *Rhetorical Critics Old and New: the Case of Gérard Genette*. In: Laurence Lerner (ed.): *Reconstructing Literature*. Oxford: Blackwell 1983, pp. 123-213, especially p. 136.

⁴ Wayne Booth: *Afterword*. In: Frederick J. Antczak (ed.): *Legacies of Wayne Booth*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1995, pp. 279-308, especially p. 291.

⁵ In the history of literary studies, the New Critics have received far more attention than the Chicago critics – which in terms of theoretical sophistication as well as priority is highly unjust. In Germany, it would seem that the Chicago Critics have scarcely been read. Hubert Zapf: *Kurze Geschichte der anglo-amerikanischen Literaturtheorie*. Munich: Fink 1991 does not even mention them. See, however, the excellent essay by Edgar Löhrer: *Die Neu-Aristoteliker in Chicago. Einige grundsätzliche Überlegungen zu Begriffen ihrer kritischen Theorie*. In: Horst

Meller, Hans Joachim Zimmermann (ed.): *Lebende Antike*. Symposion für Rudolf Sühnel. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag 1967, pp. 528-541.

⁶ See Ronald S. Crane: *History versus Criticism in the Study of Literature* [orig. publ. 1935]. In: R.S.C.: *The Idea of the Humanities and Other Essays Critical and Historical*. Vol. 2. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press 1967, pp. 3-24.

⁷ See Faiza Wahby Shereen: *An Introduction to the Assumptions, Methods, and Practices of the Chicago School of Criticism*. Ph.D. University of Cincinnati, 1988, pp. 204 and 208. On the theoretical and professional rivalry between the Chicago critics and the New Critics, see also Anna Dorothea Schneider: *Literaturkritik und Bildungspolitik*. R.S. Crane, die Chicago (Neo-Aristotelian) Critics und die University of Chicago. Heidelberg: Winter 1994.

⁸ See Wayne C. Booth: *Last Days*. In: W.C.B.: *Now Don't Try To Reason With Me. Essays and Ironies for a Credulous Age*. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press 1970, pp. 343-348, especially p. 344. – See also Gary Comstock: *Wayne C. Booth, Pluralist*. In: *Religious Studies Review* 10 (1984), pp. 252-257, especially p. 256, and James Phelan: *Wayne C. Booth*. In: Gregory S. Jay (ed.): *Modern American Critics Since 1955*. (Dictionary of Literary Biography 67) Detroit 1988, pp. 49-66.

⁹ See Wayne C. Booth: *The Rhetoric of Fiction and the Poetics of Fictions* [orig. publ. 1968]. In: Mark Spilka (ed.): *Towards a Poetic of Fiction*. Bloomington, London 1977, pp. 77-89, here p. 85.

¹⁰ Wayne Booth: *Afterword* (n. 4), p. 284.

¹¹ See Wayne C. Booth: *Afterword to the Second Edition*. In: W.C.B.: *The Rhetoric of Fiction* [orig. publ. 1961]. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Second Edition 1983, pp. 399-357, especially p. 417-419, and W.C.B.: *The Company We Keep. Ethical Criticism and the Ethics of Reading*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1988.

¹² See John Ross Baker: *From Imitation to Rhetoric: The Chicago Critics, Wayne C. Booth and Tom Jones*. In: Mark Spilka (ed.): *Towards a Poetic of Fiction* (n. 9), pp. 142-144 and 148. See also James Phelan: *Wayne C. Booth* (n. 8), p. 56.

¹³ See Wayne C. Booth: *The Rhetoric of Fiction and the Poetics of Fictions* (n. 9), p. 85, and, more explicitly, Booth's statement in: Faiza Wahby Shereen: *An Introduction to the Assumptions, Methods, and Practices of the Chicago School of Criticism* (n. 7), pp. 204, 208, 232.

¹⁴ Here, we have elected not to discuss Booth's position in the controversy of the time over "showing" versus "telling" in the novel and his hotly contested opposition to an aesthetics of ambiguity in the novel. See Wayne C. Booth: *The Rhetoric of Fiction and the Poetics of Fictions* (n. 9), pp. 85-87.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85.

¹⁶ See, for example, John Ross Baker: *From Imitation to Rhetoric: The Chicago Critics, Wayne C. Booth and Tom Jones* (n. 12), pp. 143-44.

¹⁷ See Lutz Danneberg/Hans-Harald Müller: *Der 'intentionale Fehlschluß' – ein Dogma? Systematischer Forschungsbericht zur Kontroverse um eine intentionalistische Konzeption in den Textwissenschaften*. In: *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie* 14 (1983), pp. 103-137 and 376-411. For an account of recent work in this field, see, for example, Brian Rosebury:

Irrecoverable Intentions and Literary Interpretation. In: *British Journal of Aesthetics* 37 (1997), pp. 15-30, and Lutz Danneberg: Zum Autorkonstrukt und zu einem methodologischen Konzept der Autorintention. In: Fotis Jannidis, Gerhard Lauer, Matias Martinez, Simone Winko (ed.): *Rückkehr des Autors. Zur Erneuerung eines umstrittenen Begriffs*. Tübingen: Niemeyer 1999, pp. 83-120.

¹⁸ See John Ross Baker: *From Imitation to Rhetoric: The Chicago Critics*, Wayne C. Booth and *Tom Jones* (n. 12), pp. 142 and 144; David Richter: *From Pluralism to Heteroglossia: Wayne Booth and the Pragmatics of Critical Reviewing*. In: Frederick J. Antczak (ed.): *Legacies of Wayne Booth* (n. 4), pp. 104-116, especially p. 110; and James Phelan: *Wayne C. Booth* (n. 8), p. 60.

¹⁹ See Booth: *Afterword to the Second Edition* (n. 11), pp. 403-405.

²⁰ Although plans for a revised version existed, in 1968 or thereabouts, as Booth himself indicates. See *The Rhetoric of Fiction* and the *Poetics of Fictions* (n. 9), p. 85.

²¹ The many ostensive uses of the term are therefore ignored. See Danneberg: *Zwischen Innovation und Tradition* (n. 2), p. 53.

²² This means that we cannot go into details of the program languages of individual authors.

²³ Examples of this type of discussion, which plays a less significant part in our own investigation, can be found in the work of P.D. Juhl or Stanley Fish. See P.D. Juhl: *Life, Literature, and the Implied Author*. In: *DVjs* 54 (1980), pp. 177-203 (= P.D.J.: *Interpretation. An Essay in the Philosophy of Literary Criticism*. Princeton/ N.J.: Princeton University Press 1980, pp. 153-195); and Stanley Fish: *Is there a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities*. Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press 1980, pp. 342 and 356; S.F.: *Short People Got No Reason to Live: Reading Irony*. In: S.F.: *Doing What Comes Naturally. Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989, pp. 180-196, especially pp. 184 and 186-188. – Whereas Juhl and Fish base their case against the "implied author" on the conflict with interpretive practice, other commentators cite purely pragmatic reasons for abandoning the concept. See, for example, Gregory T. Poletta: *The Author's Place in Contemporary Narratology*. In: Anthony Mortimer (ed.): *Contemporary Approaches to Narrative*. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag 1984, pp. 109-123, especially pp. 113 and 115.

²⁴ This is the position of, for example, Slomith Rimmon-Kenan and Seymour Chatman. See Slomith Rimmon: *A Comprehensive Theory of Narrative. Genette's Figures III and the Structuralist's Study of Fiction*. In: *PTL. A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature* 1 (1976), pp. 33-62, especially p. 58; Slomith Rimmon-Kenan: *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics*. London, New York: Routledge, Second Edition 1988, pp. 86, 88, 101; Seymour Chatman: *Story and Discourse. Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 1978, pp. 149-50; S.C.: *Coming to Terms. The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 1990, pp. 82-3. Compare Mieke Bal: *The Laughing Mice – or: On Focalization*. In: *Poetics Today* 2:2 (1981), pp. 202-10, especially p. 209; M.B.: *Notes on Narrative Embedding*. In: *Poetics Today* 2:2 (1981), pp. 41-59, especially p. 42; M.B.: *Narratology. Introduction to the Theory of Narrative*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1985, p. 119.

²⁵ See, in particular Chatman: *Coming to Terms* (n. 24), pp. 82-3. – This issue has also been addressed by Ian Reid, whose attempts to uncover discrepancies between the "implied author" and textual meanings point, however, to a somewhat distorted view of Booth's concept. See Ian Reid: *The Death of the Implied Author? Voice, Sequence and Control in Flaubert's Trois*

Contes. In: Australian Journal of French Studies 23 (1986), No. 2, pp. 195-211, especially p. 197.

²⁶ The expression "implied author" is seen as misleading by, for example, Bal: *The Laughing Mice* (n. 24), pp. 209-10; Rimmon-Kenan: *Narrative Fiction* (n. 24), pp. 86-7; Chatman: *Coming to Terms* (n. 24), pp. 86 and 88.

²⁷ Rimmon, for example, describes the "implied author" as "a mental construct based on the text as a whole" (Rimmon: *A Comprehensive Theory of Narrative* (n. 24), p. 58). See also Rimmon-Kenan: *Narrative Fiction* (n. 24), p. 87; Chatman: *Story and Discourse* (n. 24), p. 148; Michael J. Toolan: *Narrative. A Critical Linguistic Introduction*. London, New York: Routledge 1988, p. 78; Gérard Genette: *Narrative Discourse Revisited*. New York: Cornell University Press 1988, p. 148. – However, the "implied author" is only seldom viewed as a pragmatic instance, i.e. a kind of higher-level narrator figure. See, for example, Wilhelm Füger: *Zur Tiefenstruktur des Narrativen. Prolegomena zu einer generativen Grammatik des Erzählens*. In: *Poetica* 5 (1972), pp. 268-292, especially p. 276-7; W.J.M. Bronzwaer: *Implied Author, Extradiegetic Narrator and Public Reader. Gérard Genette's Narratological Model and the Reading Version of Great Expectations*. In: *Neophilologus* 62 (1978), pp. 1-18, especially pp. 2-3, 5 and 8; W.J.M.B.: *Mieke Bal's Concept of Focalization. A Critical Note*. In: *Poetics Today* 2:2 (1981), pp. 193-201, especially p. 196. – It often remains unclear whether the "implied author" is understood as a semantic or a pragmatic concept; see, for example, Gregory Currie: *Unreliability Refigured: Narrative in Literature and Film*. In: *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 53 (1995), pp. 19-29, especially pp. 20 and 26-7.

²⁸ Rimmon-Kenan: *Narrative Fiction* (n. 24), p. 87. See also Chatman: *Story and Discourse* (n. 24), p. 148, and Chatman: *Coming to Terms* (n. 24), p. 85: "Insofar as the implied author [...] communicates something different from what the narrator says, that meaning must occur between the lines".

²⁹ See Booth: *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (n. 11), pp. 74-5. Suggestions to this effect are made by Rimmon-Kenan: *Narrative Fiction* (n. 24), p. 87; Genette: *Narrative Discourse Revisited* (n. 27), p. 150; Toolan: *Narrative* (n. 27), p. 78; and Chatman: *Coming to Terms* (n. 24), p. 77.

³⁰ This applies to a number of introductions to narratology and the theory of interpretation which use the term "implied author", but also to Seymour Chatman's discussion of Booth's concept; see Chatman: *Story and Discourse* (n. 24), p. 151 and Chatman: *Coming to Terms* (n. 24), pp. 150-1.

³¹ See Bal: *Narratology* (n. 24), p. 10; Genette: *Narrative Discourse* (n. 1), p. 265; Genette: *Narrative Discourse Revisited* (n. 27), pp. 152-3.

³² Thus Bal, in her reply to Bronzwaer, states: "The term ['implied author'] denotes the 'norms and values of the text'. Those norms and values can be found by interpretation" (Bal: *The Laughing Mice* (n. 24), p. 209). Similarly, in her introduction to narrative theory, she writes: "Only after interpreting the text on the basis of a text description can the implied author be inferred" (Bal: *Narratology* (n. 24), p. 120).

³³ Rimmon: *A Comprehensive Theory of Narrative* (n. 24), p. 58.

³⁴ Bal: *Narratology* (n. 24), pp. 119-20.

³⁵ Genette: *Narrative Discourse Revisited* (n. 27), p. 137.

³⁶ However, Booth's own reformulations – such as the characterization of the "implied author" as

a 'second self' or 'image' of the author of a text – are also deemed inappropriate. See, for example, Genette: *Narrative Discourse Revisited* (n. 27), p. 148.

³⁷ Bal: *The Laughing Mice* (n. 24), p. 209.

³⁸ For a survey of recent work and the problems of delimitation, see Lutz Danneberg: *Beschreibungen in den textinterpretierenden Wissenschaften*. In: Rüdiger Inhetveen/Rudolf Kötter (ed.): *Betrachten – Beobachten – Beschreiben. Beschreibungen in Kultur- und Naturwissenschaften*. Munich: Fink 1996, pp. 193-224.

³⁹ On the structure of theories of interpretation, see Lutz Danneberg/Hans-Harald Müller: *Wissenschaftstheorie, Hermeneutik, Literaturwissenschaft. Anmerkungen zu einem unterbliebenen und Beiträge zu einem künftigen Dialog über die Methodologie des Verstehens*. In: *DVjs* 58 (1984), pp. 177-237.

⁴⁰ Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels, for example, have repeatedly disputed – most recently in a reply to John Searle's convincing critique of their form of intentionalism – that a non-intentionalist theory of interpretation could make this possible. See John R. Searle: *Literary Theory and Its Discontents*. In: *New Literary History* 25 (1994), pp. 637-667; Stephen Knapp/Walter Benn Michaels: *Reply to John Searle*. In: *ibid.*, pp. 669-675; John Searle: *Structure and Intention in Language: A Reply to Knapp and Michaels*. In: *ibid.*, pp. 677-681. See also Stephen Knapp/Walter Benn Michaels: *Against Theory*. In: W.J.T. Mitchell (ed.): *Against Theory. Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1985, pp. 11-30.

⁴¹ The objections that would have to be overcome here are indicated by Robert Stecker in his discussion of Booth's "implied author", Kendall Walton's "apparent artist" and Alexander Nehamas' "postulated author". See Robert Stecker: *Apparent, Implied, and Postulated Authors*. In: *Philosophy and Literature* 11 (1987), pp. 258-271.